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Dimensions of Citizenship Policy  
in the Post-Yugoslav Space:  
Divergent Paths 
Jelena Džankić* 
The break-up of the former Yugoslavia resulted in the establishment of seven states with manifestly 
different citizenship regimes. Relating the politics of citizenship to the dominant nation-building pro-
jects, this paper argues that in the post-Yugoslav countries in which nation-building projects are con-
solidated (Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia) citizenship regimes converge around ethnic inclusiveness, 
while in those where nation building is contested (Macedonia and Montenegro) territorial rather than 
ethnic attachments are articulated in citizenship policies. In the case of Kosovo, and to a certain degree 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, policies emphasise territory due to international involvement in the shaping 
of their citizenship regimes. Even though all of these states have adopted ius sanguinis as the main 
mechanism of citizenship attribution at birth, the different approaches to naturalisation and dual citi-
zenship indicate that the politics of citizenship are inextricably linked to the questions of nation building 
and statehood. To explore these issues, the paper first outlines the main traits of citizenship policies in 
contested and consolidated states. It proceeds by looking at different naturalisation requirements in the 
two groups of states. It argues that extension to ethnic kin occurs only in countries in which statehood 
and nation building are consolidated, where it serves to project an image of national unity. In states 
that are challenged by several competing nation-building projects, citizenship attribution through ethnic 
kinship is impossible due to lack of internal unity. The paper also analyses approaches to dual citizen-
ship, identifying patterns of openness and restrictiveness. By doing so, it links the politics of citizenship 
to the interaction of foreign policy mechanisms in post-Yugoslav countries and identifies the points 
where these regimes overlap or conflict with each other. 
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Introduction  
Over the last three decades, the geographical and political space once occupied by the socialist Yugoslavia has 
been subject to fragmentation, which in turn has gradually yielded new sovereign states. The independence of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia in the early 1990s, followed by the constitution of post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the gradual disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into Montenegro, Serbia 
and Kosovo constitute what is now known as the ‘post-Yugoslav space’. While rooted in the same political, 
constitutional and economic set-up as the socialist Yugoslavia, these states populating the ‘post-Yugoslav 
space’ have had different post-partition experiences, ranging from (relatively) peaceful secession, transition 
and European Union (EU) integration to conflict, protracted state transformation, and domestic and external 
contestation. These dissimilar experiences, driven largely by the interplay between national identities and state-
hood, have shaped the citizenship regimes of the seven new states in South-Eastern Europe.  
 The post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes need to be contextualised in light of ‘wider political settlement, 
reflecting, for example, contestations between, for instance, titular ‘national’ and minorities, among ‘constitu-
tive peoples’, political and ideological groups or simply citizens over citizenship and related rights, especially 
rights of political participation’ (Shaw and Štiks 2013: 4–5). While acknowledging that the notions of belong-
ing and rights are central to citizenship, the institution of citizenship is analysed here through the lenses of 
individuals’ legal status. This enables us to explore how particular policies that determine who is included as 
a member of a state and who is excluded have been shaped by broader developments of the politics of citizen-
ship. In turn, the politics of citizenship have had divergent trajectories in states with manifestly different ex-
periences of the link between statehood and nation building. Statehood is the institutional articulation of the 
link between individuals and the state, characterised by domestic legitimacy and external recognition (Bu-
chanan 1999). It is intimately related to nation building, which has at its core the link between the national-emotional 
community and the political-territorial structure that encapsulates it.  
 As an expression of the relationship between individuals, nations and states, citizenship policies are de-
pendent on whether nation building in a state is consolidated or whether there are several competing nation-building 
projects.1 The key argument of this paper is that in the post-Yugoslav countries in which nation-building projects 
are stable (Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia) citizenship regimes converge around ethnic inclusiveness, while in 
those where nation building is more variable (Macedonia and Montenegro) citizenship policies reflect territo-
rial attachments. In the case of Kosovo, and to a certain degree Bosnia and Herzegovina, policies emphasise 
territory due to international involvement in shaping their citizenship regimes. These trends are mirrored in 
various dimensions of citizenship policy, in that we can expect convergence on birthright citizenship and di-
vergence on matters of admission on the basis of culture or residence.  
 While some of the dimensions of citizenship policy in the post-Yugoslav space have been explored in 
country reports from The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia 
(CITSEE) project, there has not yet been a systematic differentiation among them. Building on the empirical 
material from the CITSEE project, this paper also takes into account the plurality of approaches to the status 
of citizenship. As such, it distinguishes between different categories of citizens on the basis of when and how 
they received (or lost) the status of citizenship, enabling cross-sectional comparison. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 
(2002) made a move in this direction when they proposed a departure from the conventional study of access 
to citizenship at birth based on ius sanguinis (descent) or ius soli (birth on the territory of the state) and the 
introduction of generations as a category of analysis. Their argument makes a significant contribution to the 
understanding of citizenship policies, reaffirming as it does the significance of the status of citizenship for the 
distribution of rights and duties in the community. Shachar (2009; 2011: 1) has complemented the work of 
Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2002) by referring to the functional grounds for the acquisition of citizenship after 
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birth as ius nexi, defining it as ‘an auxiliary path for inclusion in the polity that could operate alongside the 
established principles of citizenship acquisition: by birth on the territory (jus soli) or birth to a citizen parent 
(jus sanguinis)’ (Shachar 2011: 1).2 Hence in the context of citizenship policies we can make a systematic 
distinction between the different mechanisms for citizenship attribution at and after birth. While the attribution 
of citizenship at birth is based on descent or territory, in the context of attribution of citizenship after birth we 
can identify three broad categories of functional grounds for acquisition and loss of citizenship: link with  
a person (e.g., descent, marriage); link with a country (residence, special achievements); links created through 
international norms and processes (refugees, security).  
 A look at the citizenship regimes of the post-Yugoslav states with reference to these policy elements indi-
cates that all seven states under consideration in this paper have adopted ius sanguinis as the main mechanism 
of citizenship attribution at birth. However, their extremely divergent approaches to naturalisation on grounds 
of links with a person and link with the country, as well as issues related to openness, tolerance or resistance 
to dual citizenship indicate that the politics of citizenship are inextricably linked with the issues of statehood 
and nation building. That is, the more contested the nation-building process, the more demanding its citizenship 
policy for prospective applicants, who will have to prove extensive residence periods, socialise in the country, 
and renounce another citizenship as a sign of loyalty to the new nation. By extension, in countries where 
statehood and nation-building projects are consolidated, naturalisation policies will be more liberal for pro-
spective citizens, whose cultural ties with the nation will be the dominant grounds for naturalisation. Due to 
the nature of such ties, loyalty will be presumed ab initio and individuals will be allowed to have dual citizen-
ship. 
To explore these issues, the paper starts with a discussion of the main features of citizenship policies in 
contested and consolidated states. It proceeds by looking at different naturalisation requirements in the two 
groups of states. It argues that extension to ethnic kin occurs only in countries that are consolidated, where it 
serves as a mechanism for the external projection of national unity. In the states challenged by several com-
peting nation-building projects, citizenship attribution through ethnic kinship is impossible due to lack of in-
ternal unity. The paper subsequently analyses approaches to dual citizenship, identifying patterns of openness 
and restrictiveness in the two groups of countries. By doing so, it identifies the points where these regimes 
overlap or conflict with each other as the outcome of interaction among nation-building projects.  
In terms of methodology, this paper relies on the methodological pluralism approach, as developed by 
Michael Keating and Donatella della Porta (2008). Keating and della Porta (2008: 112) maintain that method-
ological pluralism ‘represents a normative view that in order for the social science to develop we need to 
promote diversity, rather than a single way of doing things… Unity comes from opening up the field rather 
than conforming to a single model’. Such an approach brings out linkages between the socio-political nature 
of polities and the specificities of their legal design because it avoids a single (‘Manichean’) ontological posi-
tion (Becker 1996; Steinmetz 2005). In terms of method, the paper bases its distinction between contested and 
consolidated nation building on the results of The Symbolic Nation-Building in the Western Balkans project by 
the universities of Oslo and Rijeka. Under the aegis of the project, a survey with a sample size of approximately 
1 500 respondents per country (adjusted slightly in each country to reflect its ethno-national composition) was 
conducted in each Western Balkan state to enable computation of loyalty to state-supported nation-building 
projects. The differentiation between the contested and consolidated nation-building projects will thus enable 
constitutional ethnography to be used as a framework for analysing legal change. Scheppele (2004: 395) de-
fined constitutional ethnography as the ‘study of the central legal elements of polities using methods that are 
capable of recovering the lived detail of the politico-legal landscape’. This approach will therefore entrench 
the understanding of different policy elements identified from the databases of the European Union Democracy 
Observatory (EUDO) on Citizenship. It will thus offer the first comparative, cross-sectional analysis of the 
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politics of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space composed of post-partition, post-conflict and post-com-
munist states.  
Citizenship configurations in contested and consolidated states 
Citizenship is a relationship between an individual and the state. If we conceive of it as a legal status (nation-
ality), citizenship represents a mechanism through which states regulate whom to recognise as their members. 
Explaining the emergence of different citizenship regimes, in the early 1990s, Rogers Brubaker (1992) differ-
entiated between two models of conceiving citizenship – the German (ethnic) and the French (civic). In the 
former model, membership in the state is conceived largely through kinship ties; in the latter, through territory. 
Although widely used in studies of citizenship, Brubaker’s model has faced extensive criticism as most con-
temporary citizenship laws contain a mixture of ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ elements. Even though Brubaker (1999) 
himself questioned the conceptual consistency of these models and their usefulness for understanding citizen-
ship in newly established states, Dumbrava’s (2015: 2) study of ethnic citizenship policies in 38 European 
countries showed that some crucial aspects of citizenship ‘remain linked with ethno-national conceptions on 
state membership’.  
More recently, based on an empirical study of citizenship policies in the EU and its neighbourhood through 
the EUDO project, Vink and Bauböck (2013) have argued that rather than being fixed along the linear ‘civic’ 
or ‘ethnic’ pathway, citizenship regimes tend to be configured according to five different purposes: inter-gen-
erational continuity, territorial integrity, singularity, genuine link and special ties. In their study, the two au-
thors propose a two-dimensional model through which they identify ‘four idealtypic citizenship regimes: those 
that emphasise either ethno cultural or territorial selection criteria and those that combine restrictions or inclu-
siveness on both dimensions’ (Vink and Bauböck 2013: 628). The four types of citizenship regimes are:  
1) ethnoculturally selective; 2) ethnoculturally expansive; 3) territorially selective; and 4) territorially expan-
sive. The analysis in this paper is broadly based on this typology and the position of the post-Yugoslav states 
in this model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Citizenship configurations in the post-Yugoslav space 
 
Source: CITLAW. Based on categorical principal component analysis of all states included in CITLAW dataset. Country abbreviations: 
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The positioning of the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes in the configurations model is based on the CITLAW 
indicators of the EUDO Citizenship Observatory, calculated for 2016 for the respective countries. These indi-
cators capture the multiple purposes of citizenship laws and thus reflect different aspects and elements of 
citizenship policies such as birthright citizenship, ordinary and special naturalisation, and loss of citizenship 
(Jeffers, Honohan and Bauböck 2016).  
To understand why the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes are scattered in the configurations model requires 
us to explore the political context in post-communist, post-partition and post-conflict states. Unlike long-stand-
ing citizenship policies in Western Europe and their increasing focus on accommodating migration, the regu-
lation of membership in post-communist states has centred around articulating nation-building projects 
(Bauböck, Perchinig and Sievers 2009). This includes policies intended to support the claims over the state by 
a dominant ethnic community by providing that community with status-related privileges. Such a ‘constitu-
tional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in 
a particular state’ form the essence of what has been defined as constitutional nationalism (Hayden 1992: 655). 
This practice ensured the consolidation of new states around prevailing or majority ethnic communities, while 
marginalising or excluding others, as has been the case, for instance, in the Baltics or in Slovenia.  
In the post-Yugoslav states, the convoluted issues of membership and belonging have led to constitutional 
nationalism, but only in cases when statehood and nation building were congruent. In other words, constitu-
tional nationalism has shaped citizenship policies in those countries in which nation building was not chal-
lenged either by the domestic non-dominant communities or by an external factor (see Rava 2010; Koska 
2011). It could not, however, be implemented in those countries in the post-Yugoslav space in which the tra-
jectories of state and nation building were incongruent; that is, in countries in which the building of the state or the 
nation was challenged by domestic or external factors, such as minority or constituent communities, kin-states of 
national minorities or neighbouring countries.  
Džankić (2015) highlighted some characteristics of the citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslav states on 
grounds of congruence between the state- and nation-building projects. In consolidated states, citizenship re-
gimes are generally stable, based on ethnic kinship internally and externally, and open in terms of dual nation-
ality. By contrast, citizenship policies of contested states show attachments to territory along different 
dimensions as a primary determinant of membership. That is, contested states avoid references to ethnic kin-
ship in their citizenship laws, are restrictive in terms of dual nationality, and due to the contestation of state or 
national identities do not extend membership on grounds of ethnic belonging. The manifold requirements and 
restrictions along different dimensions of citizenship are engrained in the regulation of citizenship attribution 
at birth and after birth. According to Džankić (2015: 34),  
 
This is so, because naturalisation is related to the expansion of the state’s populace, which in turn reflects 
upon the core elements of the state, such as its political and socio-economic systems. In other words, citi-
zenship regimes not only mirror the political circumstances in their respective countries, but also are used 
as a tool of managing the institutional and societal dynamics in them.  
 
The Survey (2013) of The Symbolic Nation-Building in the Western Balkans: Intents and Results indicated  
a high degree of loyalty to nation-building projects in Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo, while highlighting the 
effects of domestic and external challenges to such projects in Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.3 Table 1 presents a schematic overview of the contested and consolidated states in the Western 
Balkans in terms of their statehood and nation building. In classifying states in terms of statehood, this paper 
applies two basic conditions: 1) Do all ethnic communities recognise the state and its territory? (Yes  
– consolidated; No – contested); 2) Is the state recognised internationally? (Yes – consolidated; No  
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– contested). To qualify as a ‘consolidated’ state both conditions need to be met. In a similar vein, in classifying 
states in terms of nation building, the following condition has been applied: 1) Is there consensus among 
domestic ethnic communities on the constitutional set-up of the state? (Yes – consolidated; No – contested). 
For the purposes of this question, elements such as the approval ratings of the state’s institutions and symbols 
by different ethnic communities have been analysed (Survey 2013). 
 
Table 1. Overview of contested and consolidated states in the post-Yugoslav space  
Country Statehood Nation building 
BH  Contested  Contested  
HR Consolidated  Consolidated  
XK Contested  Consolidated  
MK Consolidated Contested  
ME Consolidated Contested  
RS Consolidated Consolidated  
SL Consolidated Consolidated  
Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; XK – Kosovo; MK – Macedonia; ME – Montenegro; RS  
– Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
 
In addition to the distinction between contested and consolidated statehood and nation building, some 
additional regional specificities are reflected in the citizenship regimes of the post-Yugoslav states. Slovenia 
is largely an ethnically homogeneous state, which has implemented constitutional nationalism since its 
independence in the early 1990s, resulting in a segment of its population that belonged to ‘new minorities’ 
(Croat, Bosniak, Roma, Serb) being excluded from its citizenship (Medved 2009). Yet due to its small 
population of 2 million and policy-makers’ desire to maintain the balance between different groups, Slovenia’s 
citizenship policy is ethnic but not necessarily expansive externally. By contrast, Croatia and Serbia are also 
ethnically consolidated states with no manifest external challenges to statehood and at the same time kin-states 
to large ethnic communities in the neighbouring countries. Hence their citizenship policies are both ethnic and 
externally expansive. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its three competing nation-building projects, and Kosovo, 
with a coherent nation-building project but contested statehood, do not have manifestly ethnic citizenship 
policies. This is attributable to the international influences that helped to shape these two countries’ citizenship 
regimes (Krasniqi 2013; Sarajlić 2013). Conversely, nation-building projects in Macedonia and Montenegro 
are not only domestically but also externally challenged by the neighbouring countries (Bulgaria, Greece and 
Serbia in the case of Macedonia; Serbia in the case of Montenegro). These countries are also at the receiving 
end of their neighbours’ external citizenship policies, which is viewed as expansion of the kin-state influence 
(Džankić 2015). As a result of this dynamic and the tendency not to destabilise ethnic composition, which 
would likely cause institutional and constitutional changes at the expense of communities that appropriated the 
state- and nation-building processes, citizenship policies are linked to territory. Unlike in the consolidated 
communities, loyalty is not assumed through belonging to an ethnic community, but needs to be proven 
through integration and socialisation. These dynamics are examined in the remainder of this paper, highlighting 
the convergence and divergence of policies along different dimensions. 
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Citizenship at birth 
The attribution of citizenship at birth has been one of the key mechanisms for ensuring inter-generational 
continuity of population within a state (Vink and Bauböck 2013), and as such is the main dimension of citi-
zenship policies. Birthright citizenship, however, can be acquired through descent (ius sanguinis) or birth on 
the state’s territory (ius soli), or a combination of these two mechanisms depending on the condition of birth 
(in country, abroad, to known or unknown parents). Generally, a pure ius soli for anyone born in the country 
is uncommon in European countries (EUDO Citizenship 2016), but the practice exists in immigrant nations, 
such as the United States and Latin America. It is used, however, in line with general international norms, for 
foundlings (children of unknown parentage) and children at risk of statelessness. This has also been the case 
in both consolidated and contested post-Yugoslav states. Therefore, differences in the automatic acquisition of 
citizenship at birth in these countries are mirrored in the ways a newborn’s presumed ties with the country are 
established. 
  The examination of citizenship laws in all seven post-Yugoslav states indicates that in all countries except 
Macedonia, all children born in the country’s territory to parents either of whom is a citizen automatically 
acquire citizenship by birth (EUDO Citizenship 2016). Macedonia, however, has a further requirement, stipu-
lating that in addition to being born in the country to a Macedonian national, the child should also not acquire 
the nationality of another state. This could potentially be the case for children born to one Macedonian and 
one foreign or dual national of a country that grants citizenship by descent extraterritorially. In the case of 
Macedonia, where both Serbia and Bulgaria, which contest different elements of the country’s national iden-
tity, grant external citizenship, the policy has been underpinned by the contested dynamic between the state 
and the nation. 
In cases of birth to citizens abroad, citizenship can be acquired either automatically or through registration. 
All countries grant citizenship through descent automatically to children born abroad to parents who are both 
nationals of the respective state. In Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia, a child born abroad ‘to 
a parent who is a citizen and another parent who is stateless or of unknown citizenship’ automatically acquires 
the respective country’s citizenship. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, the child of a citizen and 
another national, or an unknown person or a stateless person, would only receive these countries’ citizenship 
if it would otherwise remain stateless. This policy precludes children from obtaining dual citizenship at birth.  
 By contrast, rules for acquiring citizenship abroad through registration are slightly more divergent and point 
to differences between consolidated and contested post-Yugoslav states (Table 2).  
Table 2 indicates that the post-Yugoslav states all make provision for admitting children born abroad to 
their nationals. However, there are small differences between the countries regarding registration age and the 
‘presumption of citizenship’. While all states except Kosovo require registration (by parents) before the child 
becomes of age, naturalisation through declaration is possible between the ages of 18 and 23 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and up until the age of 36 in Slovenia. Interestingly, in the cases of 
Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia a person who acquires citizenship through this mechanism is considered to 
have been a national from birth; that is, the law is applied retroactively. Such a policy might be an indication 
of an ethnic citizenship regime. Even though the citizenship policies of Macedonia generally show fewer ethnic 
elements than those of Serbia and Croatia (Spaskovska 2013), the retroactive application of law in this case 
creates ‘presumed citizens’ and corroborates the persistence of ethno-national elements in post-communist 
citizenship policies. Montenegro is the only country from among the former Yugoslav states that requires 
children born abroad to a national not to have acquired another citizenship, highlighting the restrictive ap-
proach of this country to membership. 
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Table 2. Naturalisation through birth abroad to a citizen 








BH ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Registration before 
the age of 23 
HR ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Registration or  
residence before  
the age of 18  
(retroactive to birth) 
XK ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Consent by the age  
of 14 if at no risk  
of statelessness;  
if at risk, no consent 
required  
MK ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Registration by  
parents or residence 
before the age of 18; 
declaration between 
18 and 23 (retroactive 
to birth) 
ME ✗ ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Registration by  
parents or residence 
before the age of 18; 
declaration between 
18 and 23 
RS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Registration by  
parents or residence 
before the age of 18; 
declaration between 
18 and 23 (retroactive 
to birth) 
SL ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Registration by  
parents or residence 
before the age of 18; 
declaration between 
18 and 36   
Source: Constructed by the author with reference to: EUDO Citizenship (2015). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizen-
ship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Online: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition. 
Mode A01b (declaration/registration). Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; XK – Kosovo; MK  
– Macedonia; ME – Montenegro; RS – Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
 
Although the differences are only minor, the acquisition of citizenship at birth is the first indicator of the 
divergence of legislative provisions between consolidated and contested post-Yugoslav states. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, the three contested post-Yugoslav states, indicate this dynamic 
through barriers to dual nationality at birth for children born abroad or to one foreign national. The differences 
among countries for those who have not been granted citizenship at birth automatically are significantly 
greater.  
Citizenship after birth 
Unlike citizenship at birth, the regulation of citizenship after birth is not automatic, and as such is subject to 
registration of individuals in citizenship registries. The process of registration is premised on the existence of 
specific ties that attest to the person’s relationship with the destination country. As mentioned previously, these 
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ties can take the form of links with the state through mandatory residence (ordinary naturalisation), cultural 
affinity (belonging to a particular ethnic community), or special contribution to the state (merit). They can also 
be links to individuals from the destination state through birth (children of citizens born abroad), descent (ex-
patriates) or marriage (to a citizen). While all of these forms of admission after birth exist in the post-Yugoslav 
states, there are manifest differences in how they are regulated. With the caveats that Slovenia is small and 
that citizenship policies of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have been influenced by interna-
tional factors, we can observe a divergence between states with coherent and contested nation-building pro-
jects. As a result of the interplay between statehood and nationhood dynamics, in the latter category, in general, 
naturalisation rules will be less stringent than in the former. 
Links with the state 
Due to the state’s prerogative to regulate nationality matters, establishment of links for the purposes of natu-
ralisation can take different forms. One of the common ways in which this link is established is through resi-
dence-based integration, also referred to as ‘ordinary naturalisation’. Table 3 outlines the conditions for this 
naturalisation mechanism in the seven post-Yugoslav states. 
 
Table 3. Ordinary naturalisation: a schematic overview 
Country Yrs Language Renounce  Income Taxes No crime No threat  Other 
BH 3 ✔a ✔a ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Constitutional order  
HR 5 ✔ ✔a ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Legal order, customs, 
culture  
XK 10 ✔a ✗ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ 
Legal order,  
integration 
MK 8 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ 
No crime prohibiting 
residence 
ME 10 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ n/a 
RS 3 ✗ ✔a ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Legal capacity, loyalty 
statement 
SL 10 ✔ ✔a ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Oath of allegiance 
a Condition evidenced by declaration, not proof. 
Source: Constructed by the author with reference to: EUDO Citizenship (2015). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizen-
ship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Online: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition. 
Mode A06 (ordinary naturalisation). Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; XK – Kosovo; MK – Mac-
edonia; ME – Montenegro; RS – Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
 
Table 3 indicates significant differences between the post-Yugoslav countries in terms of residence-based nat-
uralisation. Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia specify a high number of years of residence (eight 
to ten), while this condition in Croatia is five, and in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina three years. However, 
the determination of lawful residence for the purpose of meeting the naturalisation conditions differs signifi-
cantly across countries. In Kosovo (Kosovo Citizenship Act, art. 10), for instance, an individual is presumed 
to have met the residence condition if their absences from the country do not exceed ten months per year. This 
criterion is intended to balance the otherwise stringent condition of ten years’ residence (five years after ac-
quiring a permanent residence permit, obtained after five years of habitual residence). In Bosnia and Herze-
govina, interestingly, the formal condition stipulated in the federal citizenship law indicates a low residence 
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requirement. However, naturalisation is administered through entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), which have separate residence conditions. According to 
Džankić (2015), due to the inconsistency between federal and entity legislation, the residence period prior to 
naturalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina can thus increase to up to ten years. Montenegro requires ten years 
of ‘lawful and continuous’ residence, which in turn depends on the way an individual has registered his or her 
stay in the country and with what authority. As indicated in the case law of the administrative court (EUDO 
Citizenship: Montenegro Case Law 2016), registering with the wrong institution could result in the ‘effective’ 
stay in the country not being considered ‘lawful and continuous’ under the country’s laws. Equally, a residence 
period of eight years in Macedonia is extended through the request that this residence is ‘permanent’, thus 
requiring another five years prior to obtaining permanent resident status. Maintaining resident status also as-
sumes the absence of a criminal history that would nullify an individual’s right to stay in Macedonia. In Serbia 
and Croatia, the conditions determining residence for the purposes of naturalisation are less stringent and lead 
to shorter periods of stay. 
 Similarly, while the schematic overview might indicate convergence over the condition for renunciation of 
another citizenship, the substance of the legal requirement varies significantly between the two groups of states. 
In particular, while Montenegro and Macedonia require the individual to submit evidence of renunciation, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, an individual is deemed to have renounced their citi-
zenship of origin if they can attest that by naturalisation they would lose their citizenship of origin ex lege. In 
practice, this implies a reference to the legal provision in the country of origin rather than the act of renuncia-
tion. Loyalty to the state and culture is explicitly required by Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia, whose citizenship 
regimes are manifestly ethnic. 
 
Table 4. Naturalisation through cultural links with the state 






BH n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
HR ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Legal order, customs, 
culture  
XK n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
MK n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ME n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
RS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
Legal capacity, loyalty 
statement, former  
Yugoslavia/Serbia 
SL n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source: Constructed by the author with reference to: EUDO Citizenship (2015). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizen-
ship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Online: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition. 
Mode A19 (cultural affinity). Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; XK – Kosovo; MK – Macedonia; 
ME – Montenegro; RS – Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
 
The difference between the post-Yugoslav countries is most manifest in the case of naturalisation after birth 
on grounds of cultural affinity (presumed links with the state, not a former citizen), with only Croatia and 
Serbia offering external citizenship to ethnic kin (EUDO Citizenship 2016). In these two states, nation-building 
projects are not contested, which explains the expansiveness of the citizenship regime on grounds of cultural 
affinity. Table 4 indicates that apart from requirements for cultural links and allegiance to the state, conditions 
including residence, integration and renunciation are waived in this type of naturalisation. Moreover, Serbia 
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specifically targets presumed Serb ethnics from the post-Yugoslav space who live in the territories of Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro. As argued by Waterbury (2014), policy-makers opt for 
this type of naturalisation in order to project power onto the neighbouring countries and use co-ethnics to 
increase their state’s political influence there. Similar policies can be found in other post-communist countries 
whose ethnic and national identities are unchallenged domestically, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary 
(Pogonyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi 2010; Dumbrava 2014). Yet in the cases of Croatia and Serbia, these poli-
cies target the neighbouring countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, or coun-
tries where there are political stakes in having a significant minority (e.g., between Croatia and Serbia). Such 
citizenship politics, as we shall see in the section on dual citizenship, have an adverse effect on states with 
challenged nation-building projects, because they adopt restrictive citizenship policies as a mechanism for 
preventing kin-state influence on their ethnic composition.  
Links with persons 
In addition to the types of naturalisation described above, naturalisation after birth can be acquired through 
familial links with a citizen of a country. The main mechanisms for the attribution of citizenship in this way 
are marriage or descent from former citizens.  
 
Table 5. Naturalisation through marriage 









BH PRa ✗ ✔b ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔ 5 years of marriage 
HR PR ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔  
XK 1 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 3 years of marriage 
MK 1 ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
3 years of marriage 
(in country); 8 years 
(abroad) and a gen-
uine bond to MK 
ME 5 ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 3 years of marriage 
RS PR ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
3 years of marriage; 
oath of loyalty 
SL 1 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 3 years of marriage 
a Permanent residence status. 
b Condition evidenced by declaration, not proof. 
Source: Constructed by the author with reference to: EUDO Citizenship (2015). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition 
of Citizenship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Online: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/data-
bases/modes-of-acquisition. Mode A08 (spousal transfer). Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; 
XK – Kosovo; MK – Macedonia; ME – Montenegro; RS – Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
 
As regards acquiring citizenship through marriage, the different policies of the post-Yugoslav states are pre-
sented in Table 5. From the table we can see that all countries except Macedonia require residence on the 
country’s soil prior to naturalisation through marriage. In this country, if the spouses reside in Macedonia, 
citizenship is granted after three years, or eight years if they reside abroad provided that the applicant can prove 
a genuine connection to the country. Interestingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia require the 
applicants to be permanent residents prior to naturalisation. In line with the respective Aliens Acts of Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina4 and Croatia,5 permanent residence is normally granted after five years of lawful and contin-
uous residence. In the case of Serbia, the Aliens Act enables the spouse of the Serbian citizen to receive per-
manent resident status after three years of marriage.6 While Montenegro requires five years of lawful and 
continuous residence, Kosovo and Slovenia have a one-year requirement. However, unlike all other post-Yu-
goslav states, Slovenia has retained language and renunciation of another citizenship as conditions for natural-
isation through marriage. This suggests a restrictive approach to citizenship along this dimension, as contested 
states such as Montenegro and Macedonia have waived this requirement for spouses of their nationals. 
 The different policy approaches of the post-Yugoslav states to citizenship policies are mirrored in their 
policies regulating naturalisation through familial links to former citizens (expatriates). These are schemati-
cally presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Naturalisation through familial link to former citizen 





Link to  
former citizen 
Other 
BH n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
HR n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
XK ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
1 generation,  
maintains family 
links, respects legal 
order of Kosovo 
MK ✗ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 generation 
ME 2 ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 3 generations 
RS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ 
1 generation, legal 
capacity, statement  
of loyalty 
SL 1 ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 4 generations 
Source: Constructed by the author with reference to: EUDO Citizenship (2015). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizen-
ship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Online: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition. 
Mode A12 (transfer from former citizen). Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; XK – Kosovo; MK  
– Macedonia; ME – Montenegro; RS – Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
 
As Table 6 indicates, the only two countries that do not grant citizenship to direct descendants of expatriates 
are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which would ostensibly indicate a restrictive approach along this 
dimension of citizenship policy. However, if these provisions are viewed in the context of the overall law, as 
highlighted in Figure 1, unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia grants citizenship through cultural links to 
the nation. This implies that such ‘claims of cultural belonging’ can be exerted by descendants of expatriates, 
yet not through the link with a person, but through that with the state. Such a policy is clearly an outcome of 
the uncontested dynamic between state and national identity. Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia offer first-gen-
eration emigrants the opportunity to become their citizens, waiving residence, renunciation, language and other 
conditions. By contrast, Slovenia and Montenegro, which enable up to third- and fourth-generation immigrants 
to become their citizens, have retained the mandatory residence (in Slovenia also language) and other condi-
tions prior to naturalisation. Such an approach to this policy dimension indicates an emphasis on links with the 
state through residence and integration, as opposed to the one rooted in cultural ties.  
While the general expectation has been that differences across the post-Yugoslav space would be starker, 
they are in fact mirrored in the legislative detail that excludes certain categories of applicants, while offering 
facilitated access to others. In sum, states whose cultural imagery spills over their borders (Serbia and Croatia) 
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rely on ethno-national policies and facilitated access on grounds of cultural claims. That is, their citizenship 
regimes are ethnic and expansive. In the case of Slovenia, where nation building is coherent, yet ‘contained’ 
(the national imagery concurs with the state’s borders), policies are ethnic but are restricted by their emphasis 
on territorial belonging. We see similar ethnic policies restricted by territorial belonging in Macedonia and Kosovo, 
which are contested at the level of nationhood and statehood respectively, but have a dominant ethno-national com-
munity. By contrast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, which are countries without a single domi-
nant ethno-national community, citizenship policies are restrictive and not manifestly ethnic in character. They 
are grounded in links with territory and do not allow for the possibility of dual loyalty (and thus dual citizen-
ship). 
Dual citizenship 
Issues surrounding dual citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space go beyond the current instrumental turn of the 
status of nationality (Joppke 2010), due to the particular relationship among the countries in the past and their 
more recent history of conflict and contestation. The nature of the dynamic between statehood and nationhood 
thus affects the ways in which membership in multiple states is regulated across the new states of South-Eastern 
Europe. The approach to dual and multiple citizenship can be open (when a state poses no restriction in terms 
of other nationality for applicants) or restrictive (when a state generally requires individuals to renounce citi-
zenship of another state ahead of naturalisation). 
This paper suggests that in states with uncontested nation-building projects, the approach to dual and mul-
tiple citizenships is open in the majority of naturalisation modes, due to the presumed loyalty inherent in citi-
zenship regimes based on ethnic kinship. Even in cases when renunciation is required, a statement by the 
applicant that the country of origin will withdraw their citizenship ex lege suffices for the purposes of natural-
isation. By contrast, the approach to dual and multiple citizenships of states with contested or conflictual nation 
building is more restrictive. The more stringent the rules for evidence of renunciation of the citizenship of 
origin (e.g., release certificate) prior to naturalisation, the more restrictive the citizenship regime is in this 
domain. Table 7 offers a schematic overview of dual citizenship policies along the dimensions analysed in the 
previous sections of the paper. 
 
Table 7. Dual and multiple citizenship 
Country Birth abroad Automatic Ordinary  Cultural Birth abroad Reg Marriage Expatriate 
BH  Ra R n/a O R n/a 
HR  Ob R O O O n/a 
XK O O n/a O O O 
MK O R n/a O O O 
ME R R n/a R O O 
RS O R O O O O 
SL O R n/a O R O 
a R – restrictive. b O – open.  
Source: Constructed by the author with reference to: EUDO Citizenship (2015). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition 
of Citizenship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Online: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/mod 
es-of-acquisition. Country abbreviations: BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HR – Croatia; XK – Kosovo; MK – Macedonia; ME  
– Montenegro; RS – Serbia; SL – Slovenia. 
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Table 7 indicates that of the post-Yugoslav states, Kosovo has the most liberal approach to dual and multiple 
citizenships, which is largely attributable to the overall political climate in the country. Being a small and 
contested state at the international level, Kosovo seeks through an open approach to dual citizenship to facili-
tate the potential benefits of free travel that come to its citizens with a dual citizenship policy. Hence despite 
state contestation, the regime in Kosovo is open to dual citizenship. This is not to contradict the findings of 
Kolstø (2014), who established high congruence of Kosovo’s nation-building project even though the state is 
contested. In terms of their approach to dual and multiple citizenships, Serbia and Croatia are liberal along 
most dimensions of citizenship. Only for applicants that seek naturalisation through residence (ordinary natu-
ralisation) do they require applicants to declare that they would lose their other citizenship. However, whether 
or not they have lost such citizenship after naturalisation is in practice never checked. Table 7 illustrates that, 
ostensibly, Macedonia’s approach to dual citizenship is similar to those of Croatia and Serbia. Yet, Macedonia, 
which tolerates dual citizenship for those who obtained it by birth, requests all foreigners to renounce their 
citizenship prior to naturalisation and attest it through a certificate (as opposed to signing a declaration, which 
is the case in Croatia and Serbia).  
By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Slovenia have more restrictive dual citizenship pol-
icies. In the former, following recent legislative changes removing the ex lege loss for Bosnians naturalising 
abroad, the law has moved towards the tolerant end of the spectrum. However, for most categories of appli-
cants, the policy remains restrictive, and dual and multiple citizenships are possible if there is an agreement 
with the applicant’s country of origin. So far, Bosnia and Herzegovina has such agreements with Croatia,7 
Serbia and Sweden. Similar to the case of Bosnia, Montenegro permits dual citizenship only in cases when an 
agreement exists with another state, and so far it has concluded one bilateral agreement – that with Macedonia. 
Negotiations for a reciprocal agreement with Serbia had been on the table for several years before breaking 
down in 2015 due to the two countries’ diametrically opposed approaches to citizenship, their recent political 
history, Serbia’s contestation of Montenegro and the existence of a large organised Serb minority in Montene-
gro. Hence the preservation of the ethnic balance in a small state is the key reason for Montenegro’s restrictive 
dual citizenship regime, an argument that has also been used to explain the renunciation requirements in Slo-
venia.  
In terms of the different dimensions of citizenship, we see openness in countries that apply naturalisations 
on grounds of cultural affinity, births, marriage and for expatriates – cases where loyalty is presumed through 
ethnic belonging or establishment of close links with citizens. The dimension of citizenship where dual citi-
zenship is commonly not allowed is ordinary naturalisation, because in this naturalisation mode loyalty with 
the country is ‘built’ through residence and socialisation rather than through presumed kinship or relationship 
with a person. With the exception of Kosovo, the post-Yugoslav countries are restrictive in this regard.  
Conclusions 
Studying citizenship policies along their different dimensions as opposed to looking at the aggregate policy 
level can help us to better understand the details of the politics of citizenship in the new states of South-Eastern 
Europe. The regulation of citizenship in the seven states that occupy the post-Yugoslav socio-political space 
differs significantly and these differences are rooted in the individual states’ dynamics of state- and nation-
building projects. This paper explored the regulation of the attribution of citizenship at and after birth in these 
states, taking into account their specific political and institutional set-ups. In particular, it has been highlighted 
that despite the apparent contestation dynamics in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, some aspects of citi-
zenship policies in these two states have been affected by international influences and the neighbouring coun-
tries.  
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Table 8 summarises the analysis of the different dimensions of citizenship policies in the countries studied. 
A convergence of polices between the contested and consolidated states can be identified in cases of birthright 
citizenship and citizenship through marriage. Other dimensions show a tendency for citizenship policies to 
diverge between these two groups of states. 
 
Table 8. Summary table 
At birth  After birth  
Dual 







Convergence  Divergence  Divergence Divergence Convergence Divergence  Divergence 
 
In all the countries examined, descent is the primary principle for the attribution of citizenship at birth. That 
is, children born to nationals of the country in which they were born receive citizenship automatically. Only 
Macedonia requires that the child has no other citizenship, pointing to a restrictive approach to this dimension 
of citizenship. However, citizenship policies of the post-Yugoslav states diverge in cases of children born 
abroad to at least one national. Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia generally allow children born 
abroad to nationals to acquire their citizenship, while Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina do so only if 
the child would otherwise remain stateless.  
 In the context of citizenship attribution after birth, the countries show convergence along different policy 
elements. In states in which state- and nation-building projects are consolidated (i.e., not challenged domesti-
cally or externally), citizenship regimes exhibit a number of ethnic elements along different policy dimensions. 
In particular, if the projection of the nation transcends the state’s borders, the state is likely to adopt external 
citizenship and naturalise foreign residents on grounds of presumed cultural links with the state. The clearest 
illustrations of these dynamics among the countries under study are offered by Serbia and Croatia, and this is 
reinforced by their particular position as kin-states to significant minorities in a number of neighbouring coun-
tries. In this respect, citizenship policy is also embedded in the states’ overall approach to foreign policy to-
wards the neighbouring countries. Ethnically expansive citizenship policies do not, however, feature that 
prominently in those states in which the cultural imagery of the nation is contained within the state’s territorial 
borders. As in the case of Slovenia, citizenship regimes will display a number of ethnic elements, but will also 
require individuals to show attachments to territory through mandatory residence and/or exclusive loyalty to the 
new state through renunciation of another citizenship. Conversely, in countries where the state- and nation-building 
projects are contested (i.e., the nation-building project promoted by the state, or the state itself, face endogenous 
or exogenous challenges), citizenship regimes will exhibit fewer ethnic, and more territorial requirements. 
Examples include the overall approach to the citizenship regime in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and ordinary naturalisation in Macedonia. 
 In sum, while the regulation of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space converges or diverges along different 
dimensions, a significant number of legal provisions are dependent on the dynamics of state- and nation-build-
ing. That is, the politics of citizenship are intimately related to nation-building projects and the ways in which 
they affect statehood. They are also played out in a frame in which international factors and neighbouring 
countries have a significant impact on the formulation of specific aspects of citizenship policy, such as ordinary 
naturalisation, admission on grounds of cultural affinity and dual citizenship. 
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Notes 
1 Nation building and national identities are, however, by no means fixed. Hence a nation-building project 
that is stable during one period might be contested during another. Yet the expectation is that, should the 
substance of the nation-building project change to such an extent as to modify statehood, this will inevitably 
be reflected in citizenship policy.  
2 The difference in the spelling of ‘ius’ and ‘jus’ in this paper and in Shachar’s work is attributed to the 
authors’ use of classical and traditional Latin spelling.  
3 While Slovenia was excluded from this analysis, the 2015 census results indicate that 83.06 per cent of 
this country’s population identify as ethnic Slovenes, which places the country in the group of those with 
consolidated state- and nation-building projects.  
4 Zakon o kretanju i boravku stranaca i azilu (Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 36/08 i 87/12), 
internet stranica Ministarstva bezbjednosti Bosne i Hercegovine, Služba za poslove sa strancima, 
http://www.sps.gov.ba/dokumenti/zakon2012.pdf. 
5 Zakon o strancima, pročišćeni tekst zakona, NN 130/11, 74/13, http://www.zakon.hr/z/142/Zakon-o-strancima. 
6 Zakon o strancima, Sluzbeni glasnik RS 97/2008, http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_strancima.html.  
7 The dual citizenship agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia has come into force only 
recently, having been under negotiation for nearly a decade. Almost one-third of the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are holders of a Croatian passport on grounds of cultural affinity with that country. As of 
2014, they are also EU citizens and have voting rights in Croatia.  
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